Employment protection legislation and informality: Theory and evidence from India
Accepted, JPE Microeconomics, 2025
with Ritam Chaurey and Vidhya Soundararajan
We show that employment protection laws (EPL) that penalize formal firms for hiring workers on contract can have unintended consequences in economies with high informality. While such EPL reduce informality on the "intensive margin"—by discouraging contract employment within formal firms—it increases informality on the "extensive margin", as some firms exit the formal sector entirely. This raises overall informality and leads to declines in aggregate productivity, wages, and welfare.
How do political connections of firms matter during an economic crisis?
Journal of Development Econonomics, 2025
with Yutong Chen, Sheetal Sekhri, Anirban Sen, and Aaditeshwar Seth
We develop a new machine learning-based method to determine firms’ political connections in India and combine it with long-run firm-level financial data to see how they responded differentially after a large macroeconomic crisis.
Aggregate implications of barriers to female entrepreneurship?
Econometrica, 2024
with Pinelopi K. Goldberg
We develop a framework to measure barriers to women’s labor force participation and entrepreneurship in India. We find that while women face high costs in growing firms as opposed to starting them, they are more successful in hiring other women—a pattern not explained by sectoral sorting. Removing these barriers would significantly boost female LFP, earnings, and aggregate productivity through reallocation from less productive male-owned firms to more productive female-owned firms.
How important are matching frictions in the labor market? Experimental & non-experimental evidence from a large Indian firm
Journal of Development Economics, 2024
with Abhijit V. Banerjee
We document the presence of matching frictions in the Indian labor market. Job-seekers have widely varying preferences over the same jobs, yet placement officers lack accurate knowledge of these preferences. Providing officers with this information improves short-term matching outcomes, though the effects fade by six months.
Marriage markets and the rise of dowry in India
Journal of Development Economics, 2023
with Jeff Weaver
Some stylized facts and theories about dowries in India, using data on 74,000 marriages between 1930-2000.
Political institutions and policy responses during a crisis
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2021
with Sabyasachi Das
We study how political institutions shape government responses to national crises, focusing on COVID-19 policy actions across 125 countries. We find that non-democracies implement stricter measures earlier, but democracies soon match or surpass them—especially in health-related policies. Democracies with greater electoral strength and longer time to the next election respond more aggressively. Media freedom slows containment, but enhances health interventions.